This article examines the ''technological appraisals'' carried out by the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence as it regulates the provision of expensive new drugs within the English National Health Service on cost-effectiveness grounds. Ostensibly this is a highly rational process by which the regulatory mechanisms absorb uncertainty, but in practice, decision making remains highly complex and uncertain. This article draws on ethnographic data-interviews with a range of stakeholders and decision makers (n ¼ 41), observations of public and closed appraisal meetings, and documentary analysis-regarding the decision-making processes involving three pharmaceutical products. The study explores the various ways in which different forms of uncertainty are perceived and tackled within these Single Technology Appraisals. Difficulties of dealing with the various levels of uncertainty were manifest and often rendered straightforward decision making problematic. Uncertainties associated with epistemology, procedures, interpersonal relations, and technicality were particularly evident. The need to exercise discretion within a more formal institutional framework shaped a pragmatic combining of strategies tactics-explicit and informal, collective and individual-to navigate through the layers of complexity and uncertainty in making decisions.
From an ethical perspective, the role performed by NICE is intended to ensure consistently equitable access for patients to drugs across the NHS and to facilitate the efficient use of public finances, by regulating NHS consumption of new and expensive drugs using cost-effectiveness criteria. 4, 6, 7 Based on rigorous appraisals of scientific evidence, NICE seeks to manage uncertainty through a calculative and evidence-based approach, amidst increasing cultural expectations of a ''calculability of consequences. '' 8 This portrayal of the rationing process might be seen to reflect both instrumental and institutional forms of rationality. 9 Yet behind this discourse or policy talk 10 of objectivity and rationalism in the pursuit of explicit rationing, the influence of socially constructed assumptions and subjectivity may still prevail. 11, 12 Evidence from statistical analyses suggests that while the demonstration of clinical and economic value is central to NICE decisions, the variability in these decision-outcomes about whether or not they recommend a technology can also be explained by other process and socioeconomic factors. 13 This may be due, at least in part, to the very nature of bureaucratic judgments amidst uncertainty, where reliance on-and correspondingly trust in-people and systems is unavoidable. 14 Whether it is confidence in research paradigms and approaches, trust in expert panels, or weighing up the evidence presented by different expert patients, leading clinicians, or drug company representatives, a range of socially constructed assumptions might influence attributions of validity, competency, and/or motives, 15 which could bear decisively on appraisal decisions. 16 There is explicit recognition by NICE that so-called gut components might be important in disinvestment decisions. 17 More recently, NICE has formally introduced further prioritization criteria, in addition to its threshold of cost-effectiveness, based on social value judgments, which include severity of underlying condition, unmet need, significant innovation, wider social benefit, disadvantaged populations, and children. 18, 19 Such pragmatism might be a reaction to media pressure, 20 legal challenges, 21 unrepresentative minority interest group lobbying, 22 and the challenging of NICE decisions by agreements made directly between the manufacturer and the Department of Health. 2, 3, 4 This reactive behavior by the regulator (NICE) makes evident the poly-centric nature of the regulatory regime and may also reflect the influence of interest groups such as NHS clinicians, patient groups, and the pharmaceutical industry with the associated claims of corporate bias and regulatory capture. 4 The impact of these and related factors within the appraisal process, and their potential influence on the intuition-based ''gut components'' of decisions, might be obscured by the ostensible rationality of NICE as an institution that formally attempts to absorb uncertainty through its instrumental and institutional approach.
Conceptualizing Uncertainty
Uncertainty in this type of rationing and regulatory context has been portrayed in different ways, with one approach suggesting the need to recognize but minimize it 23 and another suggesting the exploration of uncertainty should be portrayed in a more positive light as a means of making rationing decisions more transparent, accountable, and democratic. 21 Uncertainty has been broadly defined as ''the normal determinant or unsettled quality of a statement or knowledge claim.'' 21 The extent and the different forms of uncertainty faced by clinicians during medical training/socialization 24 and how these are managed in clinical decision making are well-documented, 25 and sociological studies have examined how uncertainty in rationing decisions is negotiated. 21 In addition, a number of ethnographic studies of rationing decisions have been conducted at the local level 26, 27 that have identified the use of different forms of rationality, although these studies have not specifically acknowledged the salience of uncertainty or the different ways it may become manifest. The aim of this article is to fill this gap by unpacking the concept of uncertainty by focusing on two interrelated questions pertaining to different forms of uncertainty and different strategies amid such uncertainties.
The first question aims to identify which forms of uncertainty are evident in NICE appraisal committee decision making. The conceptual approach adopted in this research was informed by a content analysis carried out on NICE documents 28 relating to technological evaluations. This analysis identified three distinct layers or forms of uncertainty that might be manifest within NICE appraisals: epistemic, procedural, and interpersonal or relational. The aim is to assess the explanatory power of this developmental framework based on documentary analysis and to see if these and other forms of uncertainty are manifest and salient in decision making analyzed via ethnographic data. 29 Within this framework, epistemic uncertainty relates to the effectiveness of certain methods of investigation in providing knowledge about conditions and their treatment. This layer of uncertainty might involve at least two aspects: confidence in the system of biomedical knowledge, 24 especially in the approach of randomized controlled trials, 30 and confidence in the publication system of medical journals to differentiate reliable (published) studies from biased (nonpublished/manufacturers') data. 31, 32 The second layer of uncertainty is procedural, involving the various possible methods and approaches 9 to considering/ modeling quality of life and related features of effectiveness, the vast amounts of evidence that could be considered, 24 and the multiple contingencies and contestable outputs associated with these. The third layer of uncertainty is interpersonal or relational, regarding the competency and motives of those providing evidence and/or recommendations within the process. Uncertainty may exist due to the diverse perspectives and relative expertise 33 of an array of participants, but also because of the interests that certain groups (e.g., manufacturers' representatives) have in the outcome of the decision making process. 33 The second main question explores which mechanisms and/or strategies, if any, are used to address or bridge these various uncertainties. Sociological research into rationing decisions at the national level appears to have paid rather limited attention to differentiating between different forms of uncertainty and how these are managed. 21 More generally, however, Zinn 34 has described strategies such as emotion, rules of thumb, and intuition, as lying ''in-between'' rational (calculative and probabilistic) and non-rational strategies (belief, trust, hope, faith, and avoidance) for dealing with uncertainty. 35, 36 The aim is to explore the relevance and salience of these various strategies for managing uncertainty within NICE appraisal decision making as they are applied in the face of different forms of uncertainty.
Methods

Characterizing the Single Technological Appraisal
The Single Technological Appraisal (STA) process for each technology is instigated by the Department of Health in negotiation with NICE and begins with the formulation/initiation of a decision-problem and decision-criteria, followed by a review of evidence. The STA process relies on manufacturer-provided information 13 so the modeling of clinical and cost-effectiveness by pharmaceutical companies informs the formulation of an incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER or cost/quality adjusted life year [QALY] ). Independent academic units or ''evidence review groups'' (ERG) then appraise the drug manufacturer's submission along with official feedback statements from expert/professional organizations, patient groups, and other interests. The committee is made up primarily of experts in medical statistics, health economics, epidemiology, public health, clinical specialisms (nurses and doctors), representatives from the health service, the pharmaceutical industry, and the (lay) public. Each member (apart from the chair) is appointed on an unpaid, voluntary basis. Several open and closed sessions of committee meetings take place and decisions are (usually) explicitly agreed upon in the meeting, on the basis of the cost-effectiveness threshold (the ICER must be £20,000-£30,000 or less). This threshold has become an explicit and formal norm, but appears not to have a rational basis. Decision making is primarily consensual, although on some occasions voting is used as a last resort.
Meeting outcomes are formulated into an appraisal consultation document, which is further scrutinized, and after additional meetings (where necessary), a Final Appraisal Determination is published. 17 Ideally, our study would have included all phases of the appraisal process, but this was not feasible as a result of access and timing, so this investigation focused on a significant part of this process: following the various committee meeting stages through to the finalization of the decision. However, an interview with the chair of the committee was carried out prior to the first committee meeting for each specific case but directly after the chair's briefing meeting, to which we could not gain access. These interviews gave us important insights into the earlier stages of each appraisal.
Design
The study used a prospective design to follow three pharmaceutical products through STAs involving three of the four NICE technological appraisal committees. Products were purposively selected for variation in the socio-cultural resonance of the condition they are designed to treat: a drug treating a common type of life-threatening illness, a drug treating a less ''prominent'' but prevalent chronic illness, and a drug that treated a rare but life-threatening condition. Ten committee meetings were necessary to appraise the three case study technologies. The outcomes of the decision making for the three technologies included one recommendation of a conditional ''yes'' and two ''no'' recommendations. None of these appraisals involved an appeal, although one went through discussions regarding the discounting or patient access scheme.
Data Collection
The research used an ethnographic approach to understand the decision-making process from the perspective of those under study. 37, 38 Data were collected through three complementary methods: analysis of documents; nonparticipant, unstructured observation of the meetings; and qualitative, semi-structured interviews with key informants involved in the appraisal process. These data were used in triangulation with one another, comparing how uncertainties and decisions were written about and how they were recounted in interviews, with what was observed in meetings to cover different perspectives and features of the appraisal processes. 39 Analysis of documentary outputs of the appraisal process provided a detailed background for understanding the decision and therefore facilitates comparison with the ''back-stage'' process as elucidated through observations and interviews. Documents made publicly available by NICE were examined alongside those exclusively available to the committee, such as the drug manufacturers' submissions. Observations were carried out at the public and closed sessions of nine of the ten committee meetings (alongside three pilot observations) where decisions were made, generating data for separate analyses and foci for discussion within the interviews. Ethical approval from the University of Kent was received in 2011 and those who consented were interviewed and/or observed. Pilot interviews and extensive observational work were carried out to refine the methodology. Across each drug appraisal, semi-structured interviews were conducted with a purposive cross-sectional sample (N ¼ 41), including the committee members, representatives from the various interest groups, experts involved in the process, and managers from NICE (see Table 1 ), complemented by observations across the three case studies (N ¼ 9). Generally, the focus of the interview was on the structure and nature of the decision-making process and what shaped it, with the salience of uncertainties and how these were managed being explored within the more general context. More specifically, the topic guide included broader themes associated with individuals' history and experiences, social relations within the meeting, and the social mechanisms and influences that might shape the decision making from the wider social, cultural environment. The field work was carried out between 2012 and 2014.
Analysis
Analysis of uncertainty within and across the three cases can be described as abductive, 40 in that some of the themes had already been considered prior to the study as informed by the initial analytical schema, but this did not preclude the identification of other forms of uncertainty. The themes that emerged from the qualitative data were used to refine, challenge, and extend an awareness of the different aspects of uncertainty that are faced by actors within the appraisal process and, moreover, the strategies applied (explicitly or implicitly) in the face of these. Different dimensions of uncertainty were categorized into themes and sub-themes through a constant comparison approach. 41 The data were coded separately by two of the research team members and samples of the data were double-coded and discussed to advance reliability and construct validity. Data from the observation and interviews were pooled and compared, with NVIVO being used to aid the analysis.
Findings
The Analytical Purchase of the Conceptual Framework
The conceptual framework was based on documentary analysis, but did it still have explanatory value, given the different sources of data used in this analysis that were drawn from observation and interviews? The relevance and importance of uncertainty at a general level were recognized by all the informants, with those on the committee seeing it as central to the decision making:
''There's lots of tension between the group because some will say, 'No, this is really good. Look at the benefit it will bring to patients,' and then others will say, 'Yes, but it's far too expensive. How can we think about that and how do we know that the quality of life data is as accurate as the manufacturers say it is?' So, yeah, I found that there was lots of uncertainty.'' Committee member X07
The framework distinguished, however, between three elements-epistemic uncertainty, procedural uncertainty, and interpersonal uncertainty-each of which was evident in the data and salient to the participants, although other elements, such as complexity, were equally relevant.
Epistemic Uncertainty
Epistemic uncertainty relates to the basic effectiveness of particular methods of investigation to generate useful knowledge/data about illness experiences and treatment. Certainly, the quality of the evidence base was a common theme of concern; the methods and status of randomized controlled trials were sometimes contested (e.g., the example of cherry picking given below); and the quality of the trials was seen to be problematic. However, the lack of mature data was seen to be one of the key sources of epistemic uncertainty, as illustrated in the following excerpt. This came from observations made in a meeting for an STA that was being considered for the patient access scheme (discount plan), for which ''newly surfaced uncertainties'' that had previously remained dormant posed problems for the committee, such as the uncertainty regarding longevity:
Committee Member (CM) 1: We are asked to make a decision with inadequate data.
CM 2: The original decision of £--was made with so much uncertainty . . . I would like more time.
CM 3: The age of the elderly patients is a big concern . . . we are making extrapolations from 16 weeks' data and we are now making decisions about 32 months. The uncertainty involved fills me with horror. Open meeting observation notes case study Z The data below are from later on in the meeting in the closed session:
CM 1: If it's £-and then we get away with a lot of uncertainty as it is so far from the threshold, but once it becomes closer to our threshold . . . '' CM 2: What did we say about the comparability of the trial to the population to U.K. patients? CM 3: [refers to the article published about the trial] . . . maybe they cherry-picked that population? CM4: All trials cherry-pick their participants, but normally it does not matter (for cost-effective calculations) but in this example, it does.
Chair: We are very uncertain about benefit in the long term. Nobody wants to say yes . . . the new ICER [incremental cost-effectiveness ratio] has new uncertainty and that the benefit is for fitter patients. Closed meeting: Observation notes case study Z Confidence in journal publication processes and the quality of data also spontaneously emerged within committee discussions, such as here in the context of a committee member discussing the role of the ERG, who were also perceived to be influential:
''The quality of the critique by the evidence review group, bringing out points about the original clinical trial of the data that really could put into question the validity of some of the conclusions, and this has been an extraordinary eye opener to me because it makes me look at these very high-impact factor, high-profile publications in a different light; wondering even why these publications actually got through to be published.'' Clinical expert Z06
The lack of quality data, but also understandings of the implementation costs, could also be seen to be problematic:
''There's often a poor understanding of the costs of the treatment and particularly of the sort of implementation costs, so there's always a huge uncertainty.'' Committee member Y10
The limitations of the evidence base due to constraints in carrying out clinical trials were particularly evident in relation to certain social groups such, as younger children:
''I'm personally softer at the edges around childhood illness-whether the committee as a whole is, I don't know. You know, there'll be people who argue for a very rigid approach. It's confounded by the fact that the evidence base for childhood diseases is usually weaker because randomized trials are much more difficult to arrange . . . children are generally well and therefore only ill in smaller numbers isn't such a damaging thing for the NHS.'' Committee member Z01 Thus, in response to the epistemic concerns, other social, cultural, and logics of rationing judgments also came into play, reflecting the close link between epistemic and procedural uncertainties.
Procedural Uncertainty and the Problem of Complexity
The preliminary conceptual framework indicated that procedural uncertainty involved the multiple contingencies associated with various approaches to modeling effectiveness, the contestable and conflicting outputs of many of these, and the sheer volume of evidence that could be considered.
The volume of information was a recurring and major issue for both committee members and those who were invited to attend specific appraisals. Thus, doubts were expressed over whether the complete story could be comprehended given the sheer bulk of the information that needed to be digested. ' 'Undoubtedly, what has happened in the ten years that I've been on the committee is the reports have got much bigger. The serious point is that science is very complicated; there are an awful lot of uncertainties.'' Committee member Y11 These challenges were compounded by the specialized and technical nature of the information provided, particularly the modeling for cost-effectiveness or decision modeling. Thus, this issue appears to be related to both complexity (having too much information) and uncertainty (not knowing). The following observational extract illustrates this:
CM1: The evidence is remotely realistic. The modeling is so complex and difficult that I'm not sure if it does anything or not.
CM2: This drug seems to work. It's not that different from other treatments, but if we do a reality check, it's not that expensive as current therapies.
CM3: That's a pragmatic approach. I don't know what the cost-effectiveness is.
CM4: I have concerns about the quality of the data, which is poor as well as contentious.
CM5: It is safe. It's not our remit.
Chair: We are in a position of great uncertainty. I don't have any sense whether the model is correct. The Decision Support Unit (DSU) needs to be convinced that the numbers run correctly, then look at it again. Can we phrase a Minded No [interim decision in that there needs to be more analysis carried out] in that way? Observation notes case study Y This last excerpt raises the question of whether uncertainty was reduced during the course of the appraisal process. The contrary was found in some cases, where epistemic uncertainties evolved into procedural uncertainty. For example, the following excerpt reflects the identification of additional sources of uncertainty by the experts during the discussion that were perceived to have increased the uncertainties, resulting in a delay in decision making:
''In reality, this drug probably should have gone through on the second appraisal [meeting] but we kept having this [newly emerging forms of] uncertainty thrown in.'' Committee member X14
The relationship between the independent assessment group (ERG) and the drug manufacturers was highlighted as a possible source of tension about access to information and uncertainty about what information should be available:
''The chair went on to discuss the ERG's comments on the manufacturer's submission and their re-analysis, which led to an exchange and disagreement initiated by the chair between the manufacturer and ERG representatives over why the latter did not receive the analysis that they had repeatedly asked for and which the manufacturer said was not available.'' Observation notes Case Study Y
Interpersonal or Relational Uncertainty
Interpersonal uncertainty was reflected in the perceived competency and motives of those providing evidence and/or recommendations within the process. This was relevant to a number of different interest groups that provided both written and oral submissions to the committee which, most commonly, involved questioning the competencies and motives of the drug manufacturers, the nominated clinical experts and patient representatives. For example, in relation to the drug manufacturers' position, common themes included concerns about bias and whether the drug manufacturers' analysis could be trusted, resulting in limited confidence expressed in the submissions from the drug manufacturers:
Manufacturer representative: We didn't understand the ERG's point. We did the adjustment. One CM went on to suggest that the drug manufacturer should ''give up and go home'' given the weaknesses in analysis and that their representatives were unable to answer some of the committees' key questions. The representatives did not carry out the analysis themselves and were described by one member of the committee as ''fall guys.'' Observation notes case study X This case study illustrated a somewhat confrontational, almost inquisitional interaction between the committee and the drug manufacturers:
''I think [the committee] were getting very irritated because they didn't have the answers that they wanted and at the end where they started really going for the manufacturers . . . I think the committee probably don't trust them.'' Clinical expert X02
The reluctance to address at least some of uncertainties was perceived to be damaging for the drug manufacturers:
''I mean there's lots of evidence on uncertainty that should be provided but the manufacturers still don't give all of the information. I think one of the ways that we deal with that is that if there feels like there's a lot of unresolved uncertainty, then we're more conservative in our estimate of what we think the ICER is going to be.'' Committee member X08 Finally, it was suggested that committee members' uncertainty about and suspicion of the drug manufacturers had to be balanced against the level of criticism provided by the assessment groups:
''One thing that's really struck me about all of these appraisals, actually, is if you read the manufacturer's submission, well, you should definitely fund this. They must be really trained to write it in such a way that, you know, it's a done deal. But then you read the ERG's critique of it and you think oh, wait a minute! And it makes you read it much more critically. But then, you know, sometimes they're over critical and it might be somewhere between the two.'' Committee member Y12
The committee members also expressed ambivalence regarding the testimonies of both patient experts and clinical experts to the committee. There seemed to be a perception that patient representatives tended to be narrowly focused on their own condition and therefore provided a less balanced or broader view. Moreover, concerns were expressed about potential conflicts of interest as these patients were drawn from interest groups that were sometimes supported or paid by the drug manufacturers:
''It appears that many of these companies support these groups and at the beginning of every meeting everyone declares a conflict of interest . . . I've certainly been aware of it once where it was quite clear that a company was heavily supportive of the particular sort of patient support group and I found that quite difficult to be completely objective about . . . maybe the patients might be a bit naıve about some of the motivation, but I think it is something you can't really ignore.'' Committee member Z09
Similarly, uncertainties and ambivalences were expressed about the importance, competence, and motives of the clinical experts, with some seeing these experts as significantly influencing later discussion:
CM: ''I was quite impressed at how the clinical expert was quite objective.'' Observation notes case study Y Others suggested a more marginal role:
''The role of the clinical expert, I think, is more to confirm any doubts in the submissions that the appraisal committee have. So I don't think that clinical experts really would be 'game changers' under any circumstances.'' Committee member Z05
As with expert patients, there was a potential for clinical experts to be seen to be ''evangelists,'' which raised the question of their independence and evidence of conflicted interests:
''Occasionally you get some who seem to be very close to the manufacturer. [And so you question] the independence of the evidence.'' Committee member X09
Navigating or Muddling Through?
Having considered the different types of uncertainty that appeared within the data, the analysis moves on to how these uncertainties were dealt with. A distinction can be made between explicit/formal strategies and/or mechanisms used by the committee and the informal strategies used by the committee both individually and collectively. The analysis shows how these personal practices used by individual members are organized into collective strategies adopted by the committee.
Explicit strategies included statistical and economic models available for denoting categories of uncertainty-particularly epistemic and procedural uncertainties-and thus attempts were made to technically measure and quantify the level and extent of confidence and uncertainty, although this did not necessarily solve problems of uncertainty. This perspective was evident in the following extract from an informant from NICE, who suggested that they expected committee members to reflect on the epistemic and procedural uncertainties in the process:
'' . . . we expect people to reflect on the uncertainty in the structure of the model, in the parameters used and the consequences of them. There's some different scenarios they could run and generally reflect on the timing at which the evidence has been created . . . probably the difficulties in understanding the natural history of patients without technology-all that stuff which is in the evidence-so there's a technical way of expressing it. The challenge is to understand how committee deals with the uncertainty.'' NICE employee 03
Informal strategies emerged due to the limitations of the explicit approaches. 34 There was a recognition that some parts of uncertainty cannot be addressed and therefore tend to be ignored or bracketed off:
''I mean if you would take it [uncertainty] fully into consideration, you basically can never take a decision because you just have to acknowledge that you don't know, so every decision's constantly taken on the best available evidence and what you think is most likely so, yeah, part of that uncertainty is just brushed under the carpet.'' Member of ERG Z02 Thus, one individual practice involved focusing on certainties as opposed to uncertainties, reflecting a form of bounded rationality:
''Rather than concentrate on everything that's uncertain you say, 'Okay, well, what can we reasonably be confident about,' otherwise you only end up in a sea of uncertainty.'' Committee member X03 This type of pragmatic rationalism was a common stance that encompassed several personalized strategies:
'' . . . but being pragmatic about it as well and just realize, okay, we don't know but what is the objective here and try to keep sight of the goal . . . sometimes the economists on the committee lose this perspective.'' Committee member X06
One of these strategies appeared to involve invoking a subjective ''gut'' feeling:
''I think it comes down to a stance or gut feeling on how much you believe what's in front of you.'' Member of assessment group X05 There were also pragmatic strategies employed to manage the quantity of information:
''I mean the last [appraisal] was horrible. There were two thick volumes through each of the appraisals that we had, which is why I think I've started working from the critique as it starts by summarizing what they did.'' Committee member Y12
The level of complexity regarding the technicality of the information led to a lack of participation in discussion by non-technical specialists on the committee in what might be perceived to be an intimidating setting:
''Many members of the committee did not participate in the discussion as it was very technical and at one point the chair told one of the members to 'please speak in plain English.' One committee member commented: 'I struggled today. There needs to be more education to help us feel comfortable.''' Observation notes case study Y Trust relations became salient in this context of complexity, where one common type of strategy was to defer to the expertise and judgments of the specialists and others on the committee who were seen to have greater understanding of the complexity of the modeling 28 :
''So I have to take my thoughts on what I understand from the papers with a pinch of salt. You need expert interpretation and guidance from the committee.'' Committee member Y05
This influence of particular experts within the committee in driving decisions was also corroborated by the observational evidence, with the case below reflecting deference to clinical judgment when there was considerable uncertainty about cost-effectiveness:
''One committee member stated in the closed meeting that 'There is uncertainty about the cost-effectiveness so, rather than say 'no' to cost-effectiveness, we could say 'no' based on clinical guidelines; if the committee is envisaging a role for this [drug] , maybe the decision should not be just on cost-effectiveness.' Hence, the uncertainty with the economic analysis led to the strategy to leave the decision to the clinicians-'let the doctors decide'-so the decision followed the clinicians' interpretation of NICE clinical guidelines.'' Observation notes case study X Committee members described being influenced by the committee discussion itself and through informal discussions with other members of the committee, as a way of managing particularly the level of technicality of the information:
'' . . . at committee some of the really in-depth economic analysis modeling discussions, for me, there's that level of uncertainty . . . am I completely clear that I'm following everything that I should be? What does tend to happen is the people who sit around you ask questions to one another. 'Did I hear that right?' You know, so there is a bit of informal reinforcement.'' Committee member Z09
One particularly problematic area for the committee was dealing with the testimony of patient experts. Contrasting, collective strategies were used to manage these accounts and the related uncertainties:
''Often that's the last thing that happens at the end of part one [the public part of the meeting] is a speech by the patient group and I'm always a bit unsure of how I'm supposed to be processing that information and so it can sometimes be quite emotional . . . I think the committee members deal with it in two ways; one is to completely dismiss the emotional arguments, or [be] completely dominated by them if we really understand the burden of this and the unmet need of the treatment . . . so it's a tricky one.'' Committee member Y12
The analysis furthermore found that individual practices for dealing with uncertainty were coordinated into more collective strategies. For example, interviewees often referred to shared understandings of norms of which uncertainties could be questioned and which could not, alongside the importance of deferring to the navigating role of the chair in bypassing uncertainties (''the fudge factor''). These can be understood as a collective form of bounded rationality. For example, the chair could be seen to steer the committee toward what one committee member described as an efficient decision, as opposed to waiting for further evidence from the drug manufacturer or the specialist review groups, which was seen as the easier option:
''A lot of that is to do with the experience of the chair and the way of marshalling the contributions from the committee . . . there's probably quite a lot of opt-outs that the committee could have along the way in terms of 'We want more information before we make a decision' or we will go back and will we stall and require the manufacturer to do more? Will we want the ERG to do more analysis?'' Committee member Z12
Finally, a different collective strategy adopted by the committee took the form of an ongoing negotiating process with the drug manufacturers, involving demands for clarification over time. Hence, the latter depicted the appraisal process as a kind of game or strategy, whereby you initially submitted and were turned down and then resubmitted your work with the required outcome:
''I mean a 'game' probably makes it sound manipulative, but I suppose it's just how it is, isn't it, let's have a similar scenario where the cost is quite high, which it often is, and then the benefit, the uncertainty around the evidence is very uncertain . . . Equally it's like getting your homework back and the teacher correcting it in the margin. If you resubmit it with the corrections, then you'll get the A rather than the F you [were] predicted.'' Drug manufacturer Z04
The effectiveness of such a strategy was confirmed by a member of the committee when discussing the analysis provided by a drug manufacturer:
''The only thing that that could reduce the uncertainty will be head-to-head comparisons with hard endpoints . . . And that basically forces the manufacturer to provide further information . . . something like over 70% of Minded No's become Yes when you get the information you actually want from them.'' Committee member X 01
This ''game'' format appeared to enable the gradual working through of uncertainty-getting the manufacturer to reduce the uncertainty and work through the most problematic issues. For example, in case Z, the willingness of the manufacturer to do this and ''play the game'' appeared influential in its new data/submissions being taken seriously. This appeared to be a kind of reciprocated ''goodwill,'' by which reducing interpersonal uncertainty enabled epistemic uncertainty around the quality of the data to be partly overlooked.
Discussion
Sociological research into decision making about rationing at the national level has, to a limited extent, focused on uncertainty, 21 but not considered the different layers of uncertainty that might be embedded in these decisions and how they are managed. Thus, the focus of this analysis was on exploring the extent and nature of uncertainty in appraisal decision making and how these uncertainties were addressed and managed in different ways. The data analysis suggests that various intractable uncertainties were a significant and somewhat defining issue recognized by the informants from the committee-hence, the identification of a range of strategies used by the committee for dealing or grappling with these various types of uncertainty.
The loose conceptual framework constructed from the previous documentary analysis that distinguished between epistemic, procedural, and interpersonal provided some analytical purchase in that there was evidence in the analysis of these three elements of uncertainty. However, this schema did not fully capture the nature and experiences of uncertainty as they appear in the observational and interview data. Sometimes there was an overlap or blurring of the boundaries between categories. For example, in relation to manufacturers' submissions, there were uncertainties about the data used, procedures for analyzing the data, the presentation of the data, and the general motives and competence of the drug manufacturers' stance by which epistemic, procedural, and interpersonal uncertainty were interwoven with one another.
There was also some evidence of shifts from one form of uncertainty to another as decision-making processes evolved. For example, the data showed how issues of epistemic uncertainty evolved or were transformed into procedural issues as the committee deliberated on the evidence. Similarly, uncertainty about the quality of the drug manufacturers' analysis, a form of procedural uncertainty, seemed to evolve into issues around trust in the drug manufacturers' competence and motives-a form of interpersonal uncertainty. The types or layers of uncertainty identified in the analysis of publicly available, formal documents 28 tended to highlight issues around epistemic and procedural uncertainty rather than interpersonal uncertainty, which might reflect an emphasis within the front-stage policy talk about the instrumental and institutional approach of NICE. However, the evidence from this ethnographic study that looked more at backstage decision making suggests that forms of interpersonal or relational uncertainty are important and prevalent, particularly in relation to uncertainties expressed about the independence and motives behind submissions and accounts presented by a range of interest groups.
Forms of uncertainty that the initial conceptual framework did not address included the level of technicality of the information provided, particularly in the modeling of the evidence, which led to the committee members being uncertain about its meaning and how to use it to come to a decision. This might be better described as complexity, whereby some authors 42 argue that uncertainty is a residual of working with complexity, alongside related interpretative/valuing issues of ambiguity. Certainly, the extent of information provided seems to create further complexities rather than resolving uncertainty and straightforwardly facilitating rational decision making. 43 There was common recognition that some forms of uncertainty were ignored and not addressed, as they could not be managed and that, in order to reach a decision, deliberations ultimately needed to focus down on a relatively small number of issues, with wider potentially problematic uncertainties being bracketed off. 28 This reflected a form of reasoning characterized by bounded rationality and typifying a form of satisficing behavior, where this is seen as an acceptable, if not optimal, strategic solution 43 -although, in this context, the evidence suggested forms of bounded rationality manifested in both collective and individual strategies. Collective strategies included: emergent norms by which the committee members learned to openly question some uncertainties while overlooking others; forms of collective deference to the chair or specific committee members with particularly high levels of expertise; or shared (mis)-trust of particular manufacturers as their performances were evaluated during the appraisal. These collective strategies were thus comprised of ''embedded'' organizational understandings 45 that in turn involved an orchestration of many individual strategies, 34 such as individual committee members' trust in the chair or their committee ''habitus'' as this emerged over time.
There was evidence of a plurality of legitimate perspectives for evaluating evidence, decisions, and outcomes, but calculative approaches in NICE decision making were particularly emphasized in the discussions on the strength of the evidence to support cost-effectiveness 13 and thus the uncertainties related to that issue were paramount. One primary concern was whether the drug manufacturers' analysis had been carried out using the most appropriate methodology and addressed the salient pre-agreed appraisal questions and whether the submission was transparent and accessible enough to be critically assessed. Much emphasis was placed upon the drug manufacturers' interpretations of the evidence and their tactics in presenting this, which might skew or shape the decision making in favor of the drug manufacturer. 13 However, the stance of the committees suggested that they were not passively accepting of this interpretation and could not be seen as simply aiding in so-called regulatory capture, 4 at least at this micro-level of analysis.
The interpersonal uncertainty associated with a lack of trust in the drug manufacturers' competencies and motives led to several stances, strategies, or tactics. One was a general skepticism adopted by the committee toward the drug manufacturers submissions requiring them to prove that their case was a genuine one. In response, the drug manufacturers pursued active strategies for dealing with the committee's approach, one of which was to adopt trial and error tactics, with the hope that at the second or third attempt, the technology would be recommended.
A similarly critical or ambivalent stance was adopted by the committees toward the testimonies of the patient and clinical experts, as there was concern about the latter's conflicts of interest and possibilities of being ''captured'' by the drug industry, 22 or having too narrow an experiential focus rather than being concerned with what was best for the NHS patient population as a whole. The ambivalence or caution expressed about the opinions of these experts led to their evidence being used as supplementary or supportive information to the overall decision of the committee. The relative influence of the experts varied from case to case; thus there was only limited evidence in this study to support the notion of co-production of knowledge argued to be evident in the case study of dementia drugs. 21 The stereotype of NICE as a procedurally rational, evidence-based regulatory institution contrasts with the messy process of committee decision making above; Mechanic's description of muddling through elegantly is apposite here. 46 This was exemplified by the informal strategies used by individual committee members for dealing with residual uncertainty and aspects of complexity, particularly in relation to the technicality and sheer volume of information provided. These strategies included developing rules of thumb, using ''gut reactions'' based on intuitive/tacit knowledge, and other ways of simplifying highly complex material. In some ways, our findings reflected other ethnographicoriented research focusing on rationing decisions at the local level, which identified a related form of reasoning that is characterized as practical rationality and involves intuition and experiential knowledge 9 and a ''case and judgment based'' approach. 26 In both contexts, the use of practical rationality was evident but appeared to be at odds with the dominant instrumental discourse. In these local contexts, ethical discussions and informal modes of dealing with uncertainty related more directly to individual circumstances.
In contrast, within NICE appraisals, there appeared to be less space for individual discretion and a greater coordination of informal approaches through reference to norms and previous decisions, alongside a reliance and trust in those with specialist expertise, particularly senior clinicians and economists, to steer them in the right direction. These influential players on the committee were the clinicians, economists, and statisticians, supported by the evidence review groups, who were most able to make sense of the technicality of the data analysis. Central to the coordination of informal approaches was the navigating role of the chairs and their ability to steer the committee through the complexity and even circumnavigate different aspects of residual uncertainty-a form of collective bounded rationality, toward a collective decision within the time and space allowed in the institutional framework. However, such influences of intra-group dynamics and power relations, as well as (dis)trust, time limitations, and a related bypassing of uncertainty, were invisible within the official, disembodied account of the Final Appraisal Determination. 10, 27 At a more global level, there is the general question about whether regulatory agencies operating in other countries with different health and welfare systems and cultural contexts approach their tasks in a similar or different way to how NICE works in England. Comparative analyses of how different regulatory agencies 47 make recommendations about the provision of expensive medicines in the context of uncertainty are in short supply. However, at a more general level it appears that NICE might be more vulnerable to the influences of the pharmaceutical industry, compared with other regulatory agencies found in other contexts. For example, in New Zealand, PHARMAC (the equivalent of NICE) has become a Crown Entity, meaning that it is a standalone body and is independent from the influences and directions of government ministers. This, coupled with a set budget that it cannot legally exceed, appears to make its less vulnerable to corporate bias. 48 More generally, there seems to be this apparent paradox that regulatory agencies operating in the context of neoliberal health systems may be more able to resist the influences of the drug industry (regulatory capture) than those working in the context of more communitarian health systems. 49 
Limitations
This study explored the decision making across the three of the four committees that might be significant as it became evident that each of the committees appeared to have its own ''style'' of decision making heavily influenced by the chair, suggesting that there may be variations in recommendations by committee. Cerri and colleagues 13 found in their statistical analysis that a large majority of technological appraisals recommended ''yes,'' but the three cases followed in this current study involved two no's and one conditional or restricted yes, suggesting that the appraisals included in our study might not be typical. However, in the pilot and feasibility stages of this research, a number of other technological appraisal meetings were observed and the process, at the least, appeared to be similar to those that were observed in the main study. Moreover, statistical evidence 13 suggest that the proportion of restrictions and non-recommendations issued by NICE are increasing, although referral to discounting (via patient access schemes and the recently abolished Cancer Drugs Fund) may have been increasing, too. 23 
Conclusions
Vast complexity and many uncertainties were central to these rationing decisions and the difficulties of dealing with the various levels of uncertainty were manifest. Decision-makers adopted a mixture of strategies-collective and individual, explicit and informal-in making decisions as there was a need to exercise discretion and pragmatism within a more formal institutional framework. Thus, rather than the decision-making process being neat and procedurally rational, it was also characterized by a process of negotiation with the use of pragmatic methods to navigate through complexity and layers of uncertainty.
The findings suggest that certain ''social'' approaches to the appraisal process are gradually becoming institutionalized, 38 either as unspoken norms within committees or more formally within the ''methods'' guide for NICE appraisals. Not all categories of uncertainty have been fully recognized in current policy, and this study showed the salience of uncertainties associated with interpersonal relations, particularly the relations between the committee and the drug manufacturers, clinical experts, and patient experts. These relations tend to be characterized in terms of trust or the lack of it.
